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Dwarika: Getting Strict with Judges

ANALYZING SECOND AMENDMENT CHALLENGES:
GETTING STRICT WITH JUDGES
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Hughes1
(decided November 19, 2013)
I.

INTRODUCTION

When it comes to Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has left many stones unturned.2 In its landmark decision, District of Columbia v. Heller,3 the Court acknowledged that
Second Amendment rights, although fundamental, were in no way
unlimited.4 In reviewing the challenged law, the Heller Court did not
apply a specific level of scrutiny but indicated that it would be unconstitutional on any level.5 On the other hand, the Court explicitly
rejected rational basis scrutiny and Justice Stephen Breyer’s “interestbalancing” test.6 This, at the very least, implied that the Court would
apply either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny when faced with
Second Amendment challenges. The Court’s failure to analyze
whether the challenged law should be reviewed under intermediate or
strict scrutiny has led to inconsistencies in the lower courts.
Many courts have skipped this analysis completely and applied a particular standard following the approach of previous courts.7
Other courts have conducted an analysis but their rationale for applying intermediate or strict scrutiny has also been inconsistent.8 Many
1

People v. Hughes, 1 N.E.3d 298 (N.Y. 2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
3
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4
Id. at 626.
5
Id. at 628-29.
6
Id. at 628 n.27.
7
See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); People v. Nivar, 915
N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2011).
8
See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Eng2
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courts assume that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to Second
Amendment challenges unless the statute contains a blanket prohibition, which would then trigger strict scrutiny.9 This approach runs
the risk of judges justifying regulations with their personal policy
preferences because under intermediate scrutiny almost any law can
be upheld. Under Heller, the scope of judicial discretion to decide
the appropriate level of scrutiny is too broad and allows for too much
subjectivity in evaluating the constitutionality of a statute.
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v.
Hughes,10 applied intermediate scrutiny to a statute making it a class
C felony for anyone previously convicted of a crime to possess an unlicensed, loaded handgun and found it constitutional.11 The New
York Court of Appeals failed to analyze whether defendant Frank
Hughes’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the
purpose of self-defense was substantially burdened triggering strict
scrutiny.12 Instead, the Court of Appeals followed other courts in applying intermediate scrutiny. This Case Note addresses the levels of
scrutiny which both federal and New York courts have applied when
analyzing laws and regulations that burden Second Amendment
rights, and more specifically, whether the New York Court of Appeals analyzed Penal Law section 265.01 accurately when upholding
it under intermediate scrutiny.
II.

PEOPLE V. HUGHES
A.

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant frequently stayed at his ex-girlfriend’s apartment in Hempstead, Long Island.13 One day, while at the apartment,
he heard shooting outside and thought that he should bring a gun with
him the next day for protection.14 The defendant returned the following day with an unlicensed, loaded handgun.15 While standing outside the apartment, the defendant was approached by two men, one of
strum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2009).
9
See, e.g., People v. Foster, 915 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 2010).
10
1 N.E.3d 298 (N.Y. 2013).
11
Id. at 302.
12
Id. at 299.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 299.
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whom was nicknamed “Maniac Guns.”16 After an altercation, the defendant drew the handgun and killed one of the men.17 The defendant
was charged with murder and criminal possession of a weapon in the
second degree.18 He was acquitted of the murder charge, but convicted of the weapon possession charge, a class C felony.19 Because the
defendant had a previous misdemeanor conviction for resisting arrest,
he was also convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third
degree—possession of a firearm by one previously convicted of a
crime, a class D felony.20 Without the prior misdemeanor conviction,
the defendant would have served a maximum sentence of one year in
jail, but was instead sentenced to three and one-half years in prison.21
At trial, the defendant moved to set aside his conviction for
weapon possession, but the court denied his motion.22 The Appellate
Division, Second Department affirmed the conviction.23 The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Penal
Law section 265 violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms,
and was therefore unconstitutional.24
B.

Court of Appeals Analysis

The issue before the New York Court of Appeals was whether
the statute violated the defendant’s Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms. Pursuant to Penal Law section 265.03, an individual
who “possesses any loaded firearm” is guilty of criminal possession
of a weapon in the second degree, unless “such possession takes
place in such person’s home or place of business.”25 However, this
“home or business exception” does not apply if the person “has been
previously convicted of any crime.”26 The defendant argued that, in
taking him out of the exception and elevating his weapon possession
conviction to a class C felony based upon a prior misdemeanor con16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 299.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing People v. Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2011)).
Id. at 299-300.
Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 300.
Id.
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viction, the statute impermissibly infringed on his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.27 The defendant’s prior misdemeanor precluded his invoking the home or business exception to Penal Law section 265.03, which would have otherwise applied.28
Thus, without a previous conviction, the defendant would only have
been found guilty of a class A misdemeanor, rather than a class C
felony.29 The defendant further argued that the court was required to
apply strict scrutiny because the challenged statute interfered with a
fundamental right, and any state law that infringes on a fundamental
right must be strictly scrutinized to determine if it is narrowly tailored
to serve “a compelling state interest.”30
Although the Second Amendment confers on citizens the right
to keep and bear arms, this right is not absolute.31 States are free to
pass laws and regulations which promote public safety, as long as
those laws do not unconstitutionally burden a citizen’s Second
Amendment rights.32 Thus, in order to determine whether Penal Law
section 265.03 violated the Second Amendment, the court first had to
determine which level of scrutiny applied to Second Amendment
challenges in New York.33 Similar to many other courts, the Court of
Appeals adopted an intermediate standard of scrutiny.34
Under intermediate scrutiny, the court analyzed whether New
York’s penal law bears a substantial relationship to achieving an im27

Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 299.
29
Id.
30
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, People v. Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d
Dep’t 2011) (No. 2009-07374), 2010 WL 9586094, at *32.
31
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
32
See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
33
Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 302.
34
Id. See also United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that a “law
prohibiting persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
survives Second Amendment scrutiny”); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir.
2010) (holding that “although the Second Amendment protects the individual right to possess firearms for defense of hearth and home . . . a felony conviction disqualifies an individual from asserting that interest”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011)
(stating that although the Court in Heller did not specifically define the limits of Second
Amendment rights, it did highlight that the right was not unlimited); United States v. Skoien,
614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the focus should be on an individual who was lawabiding when shaping the individual’s right to possess firearms for self-defense); United
States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010) (focusing on Heller and its belief that the core
purpose of the Second Amendment was to allow “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home[,]” which would not include those who were convicted
felons).
28
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portant governmental objective.35 The court found that preventing
criminal possession of firearms is a very significant objective, and
keeping firearms away from people who have previously broken the
law is substantially related to that goal.36 It also noted that the defendant would have been able to obtain a gun permit, but nevertheless
chose not to, thereby breaking the law for a second time by possessing an unlicensed firearm.37 The court emphasized that New
York’s criminal possession laws prohibit the unlicensed possession of
handguns because under Penal Law section 265.20(a)(3), “a person
who has a valid, applicable license for his or her handgun commits no
crime.”38 Furthermore, a premise-residence license for the home is
not difficult to obtain because under Penal Law section 400.00(2)(a),
“[s]ubject to some qualifications, a ‘householder’ is entitled to a license to ‘have and possess in his dwelling’ a pistol or revolver.”39
Thus, the court concluded that under intermediate scrutiny, Penal
Law section 265 did not violate the defendant’s right to keep and bear
arms.40
III.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO SECOND AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES

The Second Amendment states “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”41 Although the Second Amendment protects instances of lawful weapons possession, not all conduct
is protected. In 1938, over a century after the states ratified the Second Amendment, Congress enacted a statute prohibiting convicted
felons and misdemeanants who had been convicted of violent offenses from possessing firearms.42 At that time, the crime was labeled
“receipt of a gun that crossed state lines” and possession of a firearm
was evidence of “receipt.”43 This statute initially covered only a few
35

Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 302.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 301.
39
Id.
40
Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 302.
41
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
42
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (citing Federal Firearms Act, c. 850, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250,
1251).
43
Id.
36
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violent offenses, but in 1961, Congress enacted a ban on possession
by all felons.44 In 1968, Congress revised the statute, and the term
“receipt” was amended to mean “possession.”45
The current confusion started with the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,46 and its failure to decide the
appropriate standard for reviewing cases challenging gun control
laws. In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the “Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms.”47 Heller was
a law enforcement officer who was permitted to carry a handgun
while on duty, but was not allowed to register a handgun to keep in
his home.48 The District of Columbia essentially prohibited the possession of handguns because the statute criminalized carrying an unregistered firearm and prohibited the registration of firearms. 49 The
Court found these prohibitions unconstitutional, holding that a complete ban on the possession of usable handguns in an individual’s
home violated the Second Amendment.50 When determining whether
the challenged law passed constitutional muster, the Court implied
that it was not necessary to decide which level of scrutiny to apply
because prohibiting usable firearms in the home for protection would
be unconstitutional under any of the three standards of scrutiny.51
The Court did state that the rational basis test was definitely inapplicable when evaluating Second Amendment challenges to federal laws
because under such a low standard, almost all laws would pass this
test and “the Second Amendment would be redundant . . . and would
have no effect.”52 However, the Court made it clear that although the
Second Amendment protected an individual’s right to keep firearms
in the home for self-defense, this right is not unlimited.53 For exam44

Id. (citing Pub. L. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (extending the scope of disqualified persons to
include any individual convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” which is the current definition of a “felony”)).
45
Id.
46
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
47
Id. at 622.
48
Id. at 575.
49
Id. at 574-75.
50
Id. at 635.
51
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
52
Id. at 628 n.27 (“[O]bviously, the [rational basis] test could not be used to evaluate the
extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of
speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and
bear arms.”).
53
Id. at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlim-
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ple, the possession of firearms by felons would still be prohibited,
just as it has been for many years.54
Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,55 the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms is fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.56 In McDonald, the City of Chicago argued that its laws banning almost all private citizens from possessing a handgun were constitutional because the Second Amendment rights established by
Heller did not apply to the States.57 However, the Court stated that,
“a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal
Government and the States.”58 McDonald and Heller made it clear
that the Second Amendment applies to the States and its citizens. On
the other hand, the Court neglected to provide sufficient guidance on
how these rights should be interpreted and regulated. Moreover, the
Court failed to discuss limitations on the Second Amendment and
how far the legislature could go before infringing that right.
IV.

CONFUSION AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS

The Supreme Court’s failure to articulate the appropriate level
of scrutiny, if any, to be used when a law is challenged under the
Second Amendment left lower courts with little guidance. This lack
of guidance is illustrated in inconsistent analyses and outcomes. The
lower courts’ justifications for adopting a particular standard are just
as inconsistent and, at times, arbitrary based upon a court’s individual
preference for a specific policy. All of these inconsistencies demonstrate the enormous amount of discretion afforded to judges when reviewing these challenges.
Some courts have held that laws burdening the Second
Amendment should be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny.59 For
ited. . . . [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms . . . .”).
54
Id.
55
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
56
Id. at 750.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 791.
59
See Marzarella, 614 F.3d at 97; 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 861 (2015)
(stating that under intermediate scrutiny, a law that infringes on the Second Amendment
“must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives”).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 4 [2015], Art. 6

730

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 31

example, in United States v. Marzzarella,60 the Third Circuit evaluated a Second Amendment challenge to a federal firearm law.61 The
defendant was indicted for possessing a firearm with an obliterated
serial number.62 The court concluded that depending on the law in
question, different standards of scrutiny could be applicable under the
Second Amendment.63 The court further held that a statute prohibiting the possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers should
be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny because “[t]he burden imposed by the law [did] not severely limit the possession of firearms.”64
The Marzzarella court interpreted Heller as implying that a
two-pronged approach be used when Second Amendment challenges
are made.65 Under this approach, the court first “ask[s] whether the
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope
of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”66 If not, then the conduct is
not protected and the court’s inquiry is complete.67 However, if the
conduct does fall within the Second Amendment’s protections, then
the court must apply a form of “means-end scrutiny” to determine the
statute’s constitutionality.68
In Marzzarella, the Third Circuit referred to analogous First
60
61
62

614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 88; accord id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(k)), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to transport, ship, or receive, in interstate or foreign commerce, any firearm which has had the
importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered or to possess or receive any firearm which has had the importer’s
or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and has,
at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Id.
63

Marzarella, 614 F.3d at 97.
Id. at 97 (comparing the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban in Heller,
which was not just a regulation but a blanket prohibition on the right to protect one’s “hearth
and home,” with 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which was in no way similar to that level of infringement because “it leaves a person free to possess any otherwise lawful firearm he chooses—
so long as it bears its original serial number”).
65
Id. at 89.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Marzarella, 614 F.3d at 89; accord Heller, 670 F.3d at 1257 (“[A] regulation that imposes a substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense protected by the Second
Amendment must have a strong justification, whereas a regulation that imposes a less substantial burden should be proportionately easier to justify.”).
64
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Amendment cases when formulating its intermediate scrutiny inquiry.69 In the First Amendment context, intermediate scrutiny is
sometimes applied to laws limiting free speech and requires that “the
regulation serve ‘an important or substantial’ interest and not ‘burden
substantially more speech than is necessary’ to further that interest.”70
The court found intermediate scrutiny to be appropriate because the
challenged law regulated the manner in which Second Amendment
rights were carried out, not the actual exercise of the right.71 The
court stated that the appropriate inquiry is whether the challenged law
serves a “significant,” “substantial,” or “important” governmental interest and, if so, whether the “fit between the challenged [law] and
the asserted objective is reasonable.”72 The Marzzarella court found
that the challenged statute survived intermediate scrutiny because the
statute’s goal of allowing law enforcement to trace firearms was a
substantial interest.73 Although the court found intermediate scrutiny
to be appropriate, it also concluded that the statute was constitutional
under strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to the Government’s interest in tracing firearms.74 Therefore, a statute prohibiting
possession of a firearm with obliterated serial numbers comports with
that objective.75
Some courts went as far as stating that all laws burdening
Second Amendment rights should be reviewed under intermediate
scrutiny. In United States v. Skoien,76 the Seventh Circuit determined
that some categorical prohibitions on gun possession are permissible,
and established that “[C]ongress is not limited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been shown to be trustworthy with weapons, nor need these limits be established by evidence presented in
court.”77 In Skoien, the defendant had two prior convictions for domestic violence and as a result was forbidden to carry firearms under
18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9).78 While on probation for one of his domestic violence convictions, the defendant was found in possession
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 99.
Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)).
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 98.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 99.
Id.
614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 641.
Id. at 639.
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of three firearms in violation of the statute.79 The Seventh Circuit determined that intermediate scrutiny applied to laws restricting firearm
possession, deciding that there was no need to delve deeper into the
“levels of scrutiny” issue.80 Under intermediate scrutiny, the court
questioned whether the challenged statute was “substantially related
to an important governmental objective,” and concluded that the goal
of the statute was to prevent “armed mayhem,” which was clearly an
important government objective.81
The Second Circuit also applied intermediate scrutiny when
posed with a Second Amendment challenge. In Kachalsky v. County
of Westchester,82 the plaintiffs argued that New York City’s “proper
cause” requirement for obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon was unconstitutional because it burdened Second Amendment
rights set forth by Heller.83 The Second Circuit determined that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard to review the challenge under the often-used interest-balancing test.84 The conduct
clearly came within the scope of the Second Amendment and the
court continued its inquiry as to whether it outweighed the governmental objective.85 The Second Circuit concluded that regulating
firearm possession and limiting it to individuals who show they have
a special need for self-defense serve the best interests of public safety
and are greater than the individual’s need for protection in an unexpected confrontation.86
On the other hand, some courts have rejected any type of balance-inquiry analysis. For instance, the Ninth Circuit, in Peruta v.
County of San Diego,87 stated that the interest-balancing test being
used under intermediate scrutiny was almost identical to the “interestbalancing inquiry” that Justice Breyer proposed and the majority
clearly rejected in Heller.88 The statute at issue in Peruta prohibited
79

Id.
Id.641-42.
81
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641-42.
82
701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
83
Id. at 88.
84
Id. at 96.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 100.
87
742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014).
88
Id. at 1176 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 689-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
for Second Amendment challenges, a court should inquire “whether the statute burdens a
protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary
effects upon other important governmental interests”); see also id. at 634-35 (majority opin80
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the open or concealed carrying of firearms in public, whether they
were loaded or unloaded, absent “good cause.”89 The court in Peruta
rejected both intermediate and strict scrutiny.90 It found that weighing the government’s interest and objectives against an individual’s
interest in his Second Amendment right ignores Heller.91 The Peruta
court reasoned that in Heller, the Supreme Court insisted that by
enumerating this right, the government is no longer allowed to decide
whether the right is extended to some and not to others because it is a
fundamental right.92 The court in Peruta found that when any law
destroys a fundamental right then there is no need to apply any standard of scrutiny; the law must simply be “struck down.”93 It should be
noted that the Ninth Circuit focused its Second Amendment analysis
on “law-abiding” citizens, thus excluding its application to convicted
felons.94
Other courts have held that strict scrutiny is the correct standard to apply when analyzing laws that burden a citizen’s Second
Amendment rights. For example, in United States v. Engstrum,95 the
district court of Utah found strict scrutiny to be the appropriate level
when analyzing 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9), which made it “unlawful to possess a firearm if the individual ‘has been convicted in any
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.’ ”96 After an altercation with his girlfriend, the defendant was found to be in possession of an unlicensed gun in his home.97 The defendant claimed that
his father gave him a gun prior to his death, but was advised that he
could not have a gun because of a prior misdemeanor domestic violence conviction.98 The defendant was found guilty in violation of
ion) (rejecting a “judge empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry’ ” as a test for constitutionality of Second Amendment laws)).
89
Id. at 1147.
90
Id. at 1197.
91
Id. at 1177.
92
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1167 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 634) (“The very enumeration of the
right takes out of the hands of government . . . the power to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”).
93
Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29) (stating that “a l[a]w that ‘under the pretence of
regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right’ would not pass constitutional muster
‘[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional
rights’ ”).
94
Id. at 1150.
95
609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2009).
96
Id. at 1232.
97
Id. at 1228-29.
98
Id. at 1229.
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the statute and appealed his conviction.99 He argued that section
922(g)(9) impermissibly burdened his Second Amendment rights by
punishing him for keeping a firearm in his residence to defend his
home and was therefore unconstitutional.100
The Engstrum court applied strict scrutiny to determine the
constitutionality of section 922(g)(9).101 According to the court, because Heller described the right to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right, strict scrutiny should be applied.102 Under strict scrutiny, the court found that section 922(g)(9) was narrowly tailored and
promoted a compelling state interest because presumably, those who
are convicted of crimes of domestic violence pose a possible threat of
violence to an intimate partner or child.103 Therefore, the court held
that 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9) was constitutional under the Second
Amendment.104
In sum, the majority of circuit courts mentioned above have
applied intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges for
varying reasons.
V.

THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH

The Supreme Court’s ambiguity in both Heller and McDonald
with respect to laws limiting and restricting Second Amendment
rights not only led to confusion among the circuit courts regarding
which level of scrutiny to apply, but also presented challenges for
state courts when interpreting state laws and regulations. New
York’s Civil Rights Law section 4 states: “A well regulated militia
being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed.”105 Although New York
adopted its own version of the Second Amendment, the right to keep
and bear arms in New York is not unlimited, and there have been

99

Id. at 1232.
Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
101
Id. at 1231.
102
Id. (citing Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008) (“If a fundamental right were at stake, only heightened scrutiny would have been appropriate.”); and
Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e will . . . apply strict scrutiny if the state’s classification burdens the exercise of a fundamental right
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.”)).
103
Id. at 1235.
104
Id.
105
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 4 (McKinney 1990).
100
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challenges to New York statutes that restrict this right.
The majority of New York State courts have applied intermediate scrutiny when faced with a Second Amendment challenge. In
People v. Perkins,106 the defendant was involved in an argument,
which escalated to the point where the defendant pulled out a handgun and shot at the victim.107 Although the victim was not injured,
the defendant fled the scene.108 The defendant was convicted of violating Penal Law section 265 for criminal possession of a weapon because he was previously convicted of a felony.109 The defendant argued that Penal Law section 265 violated the Second Amendment of
the United States Constitution.110 The Appellate Division, Third Department rejected the defendant’s argument because the statute did
not implement a blanket prohibition on handguns and, therefore, was
not a “severe restriction” improperly infringing upon defendant’s
Second Amendment rights.111 The court also acknowledged the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, stating that although the Second
Amendment protects individual rights to keep and bear arms for selfdefense within one’s home, it “is not absolute and may be limited by
reasonable governmental restrictions.”112
Despite the lack of sufficient guidance, some New York
courts engaged in an appropriate analysis when deciding which
standard to apply. In People v. Nivar,113 the defendant was arrested
for grabbing a woman by her arm, pushing her against a wall and
choking her inside an apartment.114 Approximately one month later,
a police officer allegedly observed that the defendant possessed both
a black handgun and an air pistol inside his bedroom.115 The defendant was then charged with criminal possession of a weapon, pursuant
to Penal Law section 265.01.116 The defendant argued that Penal
Law section 265.01 was unconstitutional because it prohibited his

106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

880 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2009).
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id.
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
Id.
915 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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right to possess a firearm in his home for self-defense.117 He also argued that strict scrutiny should apply to this statute because “the restrictions on gun ownership are overbroad, the state’s licensing
scheme is arbitrary and capricious and it prevents indigent citizens
from legally possessing firearms.”118 The defendant contended that
under a strict scrutiny analysis, the statute would fail.119
The New York Supreme Court determined that intermediate
scrutiny should apply to this case because “the majority of courts to
have considered this issue” have held intermediate scrutiny “is the
most appropriate standard of review to apply to” firearms regulations.120 The court also found intermediate scrutiny more appropriate
than strict scrutiny because the challenged statute does not ban all
handguns and, therefore, is “not a ‘severe restriction’ improperly infringing upon defendant’s Second Amendment rights.”121 The Nivar
court concluded that Penal Law section 265.01 and the state’s licensing scheme are constitutional because the state has a substantial interest in regulating firearms and restricting their use to those who have
the character necessary to be trusted with such a dangerous instrument.122
Other New York courts attempted to take the necessary steps
to determine the appropriate standard but erred in their analysis. For
example, in People v. Foster,123 two firearms were found inside the
defendant’s home.124 The defendant was charged with two counts of
criminal possession of a firearm pursuant to Penal Law section
265.01 because he failed to apply for a license to legally possess the
firearms.125 The defendant moved to dismiss the charges contending
that Penal Law section 265.01 violated the Second Amendment.126
117

Id. at 803.
Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 808-09.
121
Id. at 806 (citing People v. Abdullah, 870 N.Y.S.2d 886, 23 Misc. 3d 232, 234 (Crim.
Ct. Kings County 2008)); accord Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209.
122
Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (citing Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005)) (“The
State has a substantial and legitimate interest . . . in insuring the safety of the general public
from individuals who, by their conduct, have shown themselves to be lacking the essential
temperament or character which should be present in one entrusted with a dangerous instrument” (quoting In re Pelose, 384 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1976))).
123
915 N.Y.S.2d 449; 30 Misc. 3d 596 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 2010).
124
Id. at 597.
125
Id.
126
Id.
118
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The defendant also argued that New York’s licensing scheme, under
Penal Law section 400.00(6) and 38 RCNY chapter 5, was “arbitrary
and capricious,” and violated the Second Amendment.127
The Supreme Court of Bronx County rejected the defendant’s
argument and found the challenged statutes constitutional because
“[u]nlike the statute at issue in Heller, Penal Law article 265 does not
effect a complete ban on handguns and is, therefore, not a ‘severe restriction’ improperly infringing upon defendant’s Second Amendment rights.”128 However, although the Heller Court implied that a
complete ban is a severe restriction, it did not implicitly limit it to only complete bans; therefore, a severe restriction can be something
less. Nonetheless, the court also found that New York’s licensing
scheme for regulating firearms was not an improper infringement on
Second Amendment rights because New York City’s licensing
scheme is rational with proper court oversight.129 Furthermore, the
court noted that the defendant did not even try to obtain a license legally, and was therefore, “hard-pressed to challenge the rationality of
New York’s premise residence license laws.”130
VI.

DISCUSSION

New York has continuously applied intermediate scrutiny to
Second Amendment challenges and has also consistently upheld the
challenged statutes. It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeals did
not engage in a detailed analysis as to whether Penal Law section
265.03 should have been reviewed under strict scrutiny. By assuming that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard, the Court
of Appeals did the lower courts of New York a disservice. Intermediate scrutiny is easy to overcome because it only requires the government to demonstrate that an objective is important and a reasonable or substantial connection exists between the challenged regulation
and the government’s objective. The court uses its broad discretion
to determine whether the connection between the law and governmental objective is reasonable which allows it to apply intermediate
scrutiny to policies it agrees with and thus uphold the regulation. On
the other hand, application of strict scrutiny imposes a more difficult
127
128
129
130

Id.
Foster, 30 Misc. 3d at 598-99 (citing Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 210).
Id. at 600.
Id.
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burden on the government which must demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest and therefore uses the least restrictive methods to achieve its
goals.
VII.

SOLVING THE PROBLEM

The inconsistent outcomes of the decisions discussed make it
clear that the current method used to review Second Amendment
challenges is problematic. Solving the problem is less clear; however, using the circuit court decisions as a guide provides several options.
One means of dealing with the issue is to continue using the
current two-pronged approach. The court would first determine
whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct that is within the scope of the Second Amendment. If the first prong were satisfied, then the court would determine whether intermediate or strict
scrutiny should apply to the particular statute. This would be determined by the degree of the burden placed on the defendant’s Second
Amendment right. However, the current method of reviewing gun
regulation challenges is far from perfect because it gives an enormous
amount of discretion to judges in its application. This method allows
judges to determine the strength of the Second Amendment burden
and then enable them to apply either intermediate or strict scrutiny.
Another option would be to follow the Peruta court’s approach. According to Peruta, when a court reviews a law burdening
a fundamental right, such as a Second Amendment right, the law
would automatically be struck down. However, Penal Law section
265.01 would be upheld under this approach because, according to
Peruta, Second Amendment rights are only extended to law-abiding
citizens.
Another method is the Engstrum court’s approach to Second
Amendment challenges. Because of the involvement of a fundamental right, application of strict scrutiny will protect the individual’s
rights as well as the governmental interest if it is compelling and narrowly tailored to meet its objective. This is the best approach because it removes some of the discretion from the judges reviewing
the challenged law. Judges will no longer have to decide whether intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny applies to a particular challenge.
When faced with a challenge to a fundamental right, the court will
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automatically apply strict scrutiny.
VIII. ANALYZING PEOPLE V. HUGHES UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY
The New York Court of Appeals should have reviewed Penal
Law section 265.01 under strict scrutiny because the law interferes
with a fundamental right set forth by Heller. Furthermore, the activity at issue in People v. Hughes is related to the core Second Amendment right specified in Heller because defendant Hughes possessed a
gun within his home to defend himself and his home.
If reviewed under strict scrutiny, the court would have had to
determine whether Penal Law section 265.01 was narrowly tailored
to meet the government’s compelling interest. Presumably the government’s interest is protecting the public and ensuring that people
who previously violated the law will be arrested and punished more
severely for breaking the law again by possessing an unlicensed firearm. Section 265.01 is narrowly tailored to meet the government’s
compelling objective. Furthermore, as reiterated in Peruta, the core
fundamental rights of the Second Amendment are vested in lawabiding citizens. Therefore, Penal Law section 265.01 would have
been upheld under strict scrutiny.
IX.

CONCLUSION

People v. Hughes touched on a major issue that has been debated within the United States for decades—the correct standard to
apply when analyzing the scope of the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court has remained silent on many issues dealing with restrictions and regulations relating to the Second Amendment and the
proper approach for reviewing a challenge to such a fundamental
right under the Constitution. The circuit courts have all agreed that
the rights codified by Heller, which were made applicable to the
states by McDonald, are not unlimited.131 Yet, the right to possess a
handgun in one’s home for self-defense is arguably the most protected right that an individual has under the Second Amendment.
Here, however, not only did Hughes break the law once by resisting arrest, he continued his unlawful habits by purchasing a firearm without first going through the protocols of obtaining a firearm
131

See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 639; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at
95; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1151.
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permit, which is required by the Rules of the City of New York. As
the court in Hughes pointed out, had the defendant applied for a firearm permit to protect his home, his application likely would have
been granted because his prior conviction of resisting arrest was relatively minor and did not have a significant impact on his ability to
possess a firearm. However, by not abiding by the law yet again the
defendant was rightfully convicted of a class C felony for possessing
an unlicensed, loaded firearm in his home subsequent to being convicted of a crime. Al-though the court clearly stated that Hughes
likely would have been able to obtain a permit, such permission
would be inconsistent with applying Penal Law section 265.03 to
him. The purpose behind the law is to keep guns away from those
who have committed crimes in the past because the presumption is
that they are a continuing danger and the court’s notion that Hughes
would have been allowed to obtain a permit is inconsistent with the
application of Penal Law section 265.03. Allowing Hughes to obtain
a permit indicates that his previous offense was not serious enough to
consider him a threat, but it is significant enough in its applicability
to section 265 that it gave him a harsher sentence. The court is in essence saying that the previous crime is not significant in one instance
but it is significant in another.
Hughes is the first case in which the New York Court of Appeals has taken a stance on what level of scrutiny to apply when deciding a Second Amendment issue. The implications of this decision
are important. It can be very dangerous if courts analyze all laws under intermediate scrutiny because almost any law can be justified as
serving a substantial governmental interest. This presents a threat
because it is easy for fundamental rights, such as the Second
Amendment, to be infringed and eroded by laws and regulations.
The current method of reviewing Second Amendment issues gives
judges too much discretion when determining whether the challenged
law should be upheld and applying strict scrutiny to all of these challenges allows for some consistency and gives judges less room to
promote their policy preferences.
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